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ABSTRACT
The identity and/or location of communicating entities in wireless ad hoc networks is extremely important due to the
potential of their being identified and subsequently subjected to cyber or physical attacks. In this paper, we show that a
global attacker who can eavesdrop on the overall data transmissions and count them can simply visualize the transmissions
and infer contextual information. Current approaches to obfuscate the locations of source and destinations do not provide
protection against such attacks. We propose two novel techniques (1) SECLOUD: Source and Destination Seclusion using
Clouds to obfuscate the true source/destination nodes and make them indistinguishable among a group of neighbor nodes,
and (2) ANONYRING: Anonymous Ring which hides the source/destination nodes within a group of nodes that form a
ring. Both proposed techniques work well even under network-wide traffic visualization by a global attacker. Furthermore
the proposed techniques are shown via simulation to be superior to existing schemes in the literature. Copyright © 2010
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Malicious traffic analysis and privacy attacks against com-
municating nodes are passive and difficult to detect in large
wireless ad hoc networks [1]. The disclosure of contextual
information about network traffic patterns can be dangerous
in sensitive application scenarios. For example, in tactical
military wireless networks, command centers could be com-
municating with each other through an ad hoc network of
intermediate nodes. Analysis of traffic in such an environ-
ment may reveal the locations of command centers which
will enable the adversaries to launch targeted cyber or phys-
ical attacks on them. Hence, it is critical to hide the location
of the source and destination for quasi-stationary commu-
nicating nodes in ad hoc networks.
Traffic analysis attacks make use of rate monitoring that
involves counting the number of transmitted/received pack-
ets around network nodes and time-correlation analysis
that involves finding communication patterns by analyz-
ing latencies between packet transmissions around nodes.
Both techniques can be used independently or together
to determine the communicating source–destination node
pairs. Attackers can be broadly classified as either local or
global. A local attacker can generally eavesdrop on trans-
mitted packets around one node at a time and does not know
the overall network topology. On the other hand, a global
attacker [2] is able to visualize the overall network topology
and is capable of network-wide traffic rate monitoring and
time-correlation analysis.
Recently different methods have been proposed in the
literature for defending against traffic analysis and loca-
tion privacy related attacks in wireless networks [2--5].
These approaches provide some level of protection against
attackers by thwarting traffic analysis attacks and mislead-
ing attackers with randomized or fake traffic [1--4,6--8].
However, several of these approaches primarily deal with
location privacy in wireless sensor networks where the
entity to be protected is a sink node [3,5] or specific sensing
sources [6--8]. Furthermore, existing solutions to obfuscate
the locations of source or destination nodes do not work
well when a global attacker exists.
In this paper, we address the problem of hiding the
source/destination nodes from an attacker with a complete
view of the network topology and traffic. We propose two
Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 1
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simple and efficient techniques for protection against such
a global adversary: (i) SECLOUD: source and destination
Seclusion using Clouds, that hides the source and desti-
nation nodes in a group of nodes (called a ‘cloud’) that
are indistinguishable and (ii) ANONYRING: Anonymous
source/destination transmission using a Ring communica-
tion path that obfuscates the source and destination nodes
in a set of identical nodes comprising a ring. The per-
formance of SECLOUD and ANONYRING are evaluated
assuming a sophisticated global attacker capable of using
network-wide traffic visualization. We compare SECLOUD
and ANONYRING with two commonly used obfuscation
techniques, Random Walk (RW) and Fractal Propagation
(FP) [3,7] using overhead, anonymity, and unlinkability
as metrics. Our simulation results and analyses show that
SECLOUD and ANONYRING provide better anonymity
than either RW or FP schemes in the presence of a global
traffic visualization attack, while having a comparable
overhead. Additionally, we show that entropy, which is a
commonly used metric, is not always an adequate measure
of the degree of anonymity provided by a technique.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes related work on obfuscation/privacy techniques.
The attacker model, network assumptions, and performance
metrics are presented in Section 3. The details of the
SECLOUD and ANONYRING protocols are explained in
Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 presents the results
with comparative performance evaluation and discussions.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. RELATED WORK
Here, we briefly summarize related literature on hiding
source and destination nodes in wireless networks fol-
lowed by a more detailed description of the Random Walk
and Fractal Propagation schemes since we use them for a
comparison with our proposed schemes. While these tech-
niques are effective against local attacks, they have not been
extensively evaluated under global attack conditions. As
we show later, eavesdropping by a global attacker (which
can count packets and visualize the network-wide traffic)
can expose the source and destination regions. We note
here that most of the current research work assumes that
all packets are encrypted link-by-link, padded to prevent
potential packet type identification through size, and use
anonymous routing schemes to avoid detection of routes
during route set-up. Energy constraints and overhead are
typically not factored because the underlying assumption is
that obfuscation requires transmission of dummy packets.
Phantom routing is a source-node location hiding tech-
nique used in References [6,9] to protect against the threat
of a local attacker. In this technique each packet poten-
tially traverses a different random path of distance H-hops
to a phantom source (i.e., a bogus source node) in the net-
work. Then, the phantom source uses either shortest path
[6] or localized flooding [9] to send packets to the final
destination. This scheme prevents attackers from discov-
ering the source node’s true location by eavesdropping on
wireless links hop-by-hop. A similar idea is used in Ref-
erence [10], where a path confusion algorithm is used to
increase source location anonymity under a local adversary
model. Mehta et al. in Reference [2] proposed a scheme
under a global attack model by hiding the real source among
k − 1 fake sources that emulate the information sensing pat-
tern of real sources in a sensor network. In Reference [8],
under a global attack model, the authors proposed statisti-
cally strong source anonymity by employing network-wide
dummy messages to achieve global privacy. In Reference
[4], the authors introduce a similar approach with care-
fully chosen dummy traffic to hide the real event sources in
combination with mechanisms to drop dummy messages to
prevent an explosion of network traffic. Some sensor nodes
act as proxies that proactively filter dummy messages on
their way to the base station destination. The amount of
dummy traffic and location & number of fake sources are
important factors that determine the effectiveness of the
aforementioned obfuscation mechanisms.
2.1. Random walk
In Random Walk-based (RW) obfuscation schemes [6,9],
packets at a node are forwarded probabilistically to one
of the neighbor nodes within transmission range, and this
process continues at each node until the packets reach
the destination. This method diversifies routing paths in
an unpredictable manner, to avoid rate monitoring attacks
against a local eavesdropper. The ability to hide sources and
destinations is controlled by the probability Pr to forward
in the direction of the destination and probability (1 − Pr)
to randomly forward to one of neighboring nodes [3].
The RW scheme is effective against local attackers with
no prior knowledge of the overall network topology and
it increases the complexity and attack time to search for
the destination in large ad hoc networks. However, it gen-
erally leads to a longer routing path on average than the
shortest path. This in turn incurs a much higher energy con-
sumption and additional delay that is proportional to the
extra distance required to forward packets to the destination.
The effectiveness of RW depends on the network’s node
degree, connectivity, and the source–destination distance.
Directed Random Walk (DRW) proposed in Reference [9]
is an evolved version of RW that makes use of directional
information to obfuscate forwarding of packets. DRW con-
siders two groups of neighbor nodes in opposing directions
in which one node is randomly picked so that the walk (i.e.,
packet forwarding path) leaves the source area to reach the
destination. However, grouping the neighbor nodes based
on direction requires location information. Xi et al. [7]
proposed another RW improvement, referred as Greedy
Random Walk (GROW) scheme, for preserving location
privacy of the source node. GROW uses a bi-directional
random walk on a per-packet basis from the main source
and destination to confuse a local eavesdropper from trac-
ing the communication path. GROW enhances the basic RW
2 Security Comm. Networks 2010; 3:1–27 © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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by using local broadcasting and filtering. From the source,
each node forwards packets randomly by broadcasting to
its least used neighbor node for a certain minimum number
of hops until it intersects a randomly pre-established recep-
tor node along the destination path at some point. Overall,
the RW based schemes show that using erratic per-packet
routes is very effective in resisting rate monitoring and traf-
fic analysis attacks by adversaries monitoring a limited set
of nodes.
2.2. Fractal propagation
Deng et al., [3] proposed fractal propagation (FP) to coun-
teract local rate monitoring and correlation attacks in sensor
networks. Fractal propagation overcomes one of the draw-
backs of the random walk scheme by introducing fake
packets which are spread out to combat time correlation
attacks [3]. When a node forwards a real packet, its neigh-
bor nodes can generate a fake packet with probability (Pf ).
The fake packet is forwarded to a randomly chosen neighbor
node each time over a propagation distance of k-hops. The
propagation distance k of the fake packets causes network
traffic to appear spread out along different routes resulting
in tree-like transmission paths that are more diffuse than the
random walk method. Thus, a local attacker takes more time
to find the path taken by real packets as it cannot differentiate
between encrypted real packets and encrypted fake packets.
The performance of fractal propagation can be adjusted by
varying the parameters Pf and k. Higher traffic randomness
and path confusion is achieved by increasing Pf and k, but
the overhead/energy cost will also increase rapidly as well,
as more packets collide and higher packet loss rates occur,
especially near the destination node.
3. MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS
3.1. Network model
Our assumptions are consistent with most of the related
work in the literature. Specifically, we consider an ad hoc
network with nodes being distributed either in a grid like
manner or randomly. All the MAC and routing protocol
messages are assumed to be encrypted so that no leakage
of information occurs to the adversary. The nodes’ MAC
address, IP address and node IDs are also hidden and not
advertised. In Reference [11] the authors used short-lived
disposable MAC addresses to prevent the real node IDs
from being revealed to adversaries. A similar technique is
assumed here to avoid identification of nodes.
We assume the existence of a key management protocol
that can distribute pair-wise keys between nodes or public-
secret key pairs for each node [12,13]. Any of these schemes
can be used to set up pairwise keys and authenticate node
relationships and we omit the details here. Each packet is
encrypted and authenticated so that an adversary cannot
decrypt or modify the contents of an eavesdropped packet
transmission. All packets are transmitted in the same for-
mat and have same length (by padding or fragmenting).
Finally, route discovery communications are assumed to
be anonymous using any of the anonymous routing proto-
cols such as in References [14--18]. An anonymous routing
protocol allows neighbor nodes to authenticate each other
without revealing their identities. For example, in Refer-
ence [14] the anonymous neighbor authentication is based
on dynamically changing pseudonyms of nodes instead of
their real identifiers or MAC addresses. Anonymous route
discovery and data forwarding employs pairwise shared link
identifiers between neighbor nodes which are created and
established during neighborhood authentication.
3.2. Attack model
An external, global attacker model is assumed in this paper
that has the combined capabilities of different existing
attack models as described in References [2,3,19]. The
attacker has complete knowledge of the network topology
and can keep statistical measurements for all of the network
traffic. We assume that the global attacker can perform rate
monitoring and time correlation analysis for all traffic in
the network (which is a stronger attack than correspond-
ing ones assumed elsewhere). The attacker can visualize
statistics (e.g., packet count in a time window) of all trans-
mitted/received packets in the network and determine the
traffic density on every link in the network. Furthermore,
we assume the attacker can use advanced visualization tech-
niques such as edge detection image processing algorithms
to possibly extract the traffic pattern. Details are provided
in Section 6.
A possible method for the global attack above is deploy-
ing an overlay/underlay network with several malicious
nodes simply to passively sense traffic from the given ad hoc
network, similar to the idea in Reference [2]. These nodes
can collect information and collaborate with a centralized
entity using a different band.
3.3. Evaluation metrics
We analyze the performance of SECLOUD,
ANONYRING, Random Walk, and Fractal Propaga-
tion using the metrics—anonymity, unlinkability [19],
entropy, and the overhead incurred by the technique.
3.3.1. Anonymity.
Anonymity means hiding information about which node
behaves as the source or the destination. The level of
anonymity λ is defined as the probability that a node of
interest is incorrectly identified in an anonymous group
[19]. If a node is hidden among a set A of nodes that
have identical behavior, then the level of anonymity is
λ = 1 − (1/|A|) where |A| is the size of a set A. Thus,
the anonymity level of a node (source or destination in our
Security Comm. Networks 2010; 3:1–27 © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 3
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case) depends on the number of nodes in the anonymous
zone. If the source node is hidden in a set of nodes AS
and the destination is hidden in a disjoint set of nodes AD
then the anonymity of the source–destination pair is given
by λ = 1 − (1/|AS |)(1/|AD|). Untraceability is a similar
notion that indicates how difficult it is for an adversary to
identify the packet transmissions from a source based on
receptions at the destination.
3.3.2. Unlinkability.
Unlinkability is a generalization of the notion of
anonymity and untraceability, (i.e., hiding any contextual
information about the relationship between source–
destination pairs). We employ a 2-D packet count matrix and
a 3-D graph of transmitted data around nodes to determine
whether or not a global attacker can visualize the existence
of communication between a source and destination and
thus link them.
3.3.3. Entropy.
Entropy is a common metric for quantifying uncertainty
in information theory and is often used as a measure of ‘hid-
ing’ or ‘privacy’ [3] since an increase in entropy is indicative
of an increase in uncertainty in information. An entropy-
based measure of privacy is given as H = −∑
i
px log2 px
where px is the probability for the attacker that the observed
data transmissions were from node x in the anonymity set
A of size |A|. It can be normalized to obtain a privacy met-
ric value between 0 (no privacy) and 1 (guaranteed perfect
privacy), as  = H/Hmax , where Hmax = − log2 px with
px = |A|. While entropy is an appealing concept providing
a scalar number for privacy, it does not capture the amount of
contextual information available that can disclose the loca-
tion of source and destination nodes. For example, most
nodes may be sending roughly similar numbers of packets.
This results in a high average entropy. But the few nodes that
send more packets may be sufficient to reveal the identity
or location of a source or destination node. We will show
in our simulation based results that an increasing entropy
value does not necessarily imply that the source–destination
nodes are adequately hidden.
3.3.4. Overhead.
We define the transmission overhead factor (TOF) as
the ratio of total number of packets transmitted by nodes
using an obfuscation technique to the total number of trans-
missions without the obfuscation technique using simply
shortest path routing between source and destination nodes.
The transmission overhead is also directly related to the
energy consumption of nodes when using the obfuscation
mechanisms for communication.
4. THE SECLOUD PROTOCOL
The general idea of SECLOUD, is to seclude the source and
destination node locations within a cloud of irregular shape
that is constructed using its neighboring nodes. The details
of this protocol are explained in the following.
Let S denote the source node and D denote the desti-
nation node of the communicating node pair. The protocol
first conducts neighborhood discovery to form the poten-
tial cloudy region around the source and destination. The
source node S first broadcasts a hello message to dis-
cover all its one-hop neighborsNS(1, i) for i = (1, 2, . . . m),
where m is the total number of neighbor nodes. Then,
the nodes in NS(1, i) discover their respective neigh-
bors NS(2, i) which are two-hops away from node S.
Consequently, source node S constructs the list: RS =
{NS(1, i), NS(2, i), NS(3, i), . . . NS(k, i)}, where NS(k, i) is
the set of kth hop neighbors of node S. This initializa-
tion process of neighbor discovery is done periodically
by all nodes i in the network, for (1 ≤ i ≤ n). This
will ensure that the attacker cannot determine which
of the nodes performing the initialization will be the
source.
Once the source node has identified the set RS of
k nearest neighbors, it forms a cloud by first selecting
the center point of the cloud No arbitrarily from RS .
As an example, let k = 3. The source node S will then
request node No to send its set of k neighbor nodes Ro =
{No(1, i), No(2, i), No(3, i)}. It will randomly select a set
of nodes, B for the cloud, such that B ⊆ Ro. This will
keep the cloud region irregular—the source cannot be pre-
dicted to be in the center of the cloud for example. The
nodes in B will be marked as pseudo-sources in the cloud
and are requested to transmit encrypted dummy packets
at a rate similar to the source transmission rate. Dummy
packets are simply dropped. The destination node D will
also follow the same initialization procedure to construct a
cloud. Note the size of the source and the destination clouds
can be different by using different values of k and B for
each, depending on the obfuscation strength needed on each
side.
Let BS denote the size of the source cloud drawn from a
set of kS hop neighbors and BD denote the size of the desti-
nation cloud which is drawn from a set of kD hop neighbors.
To further hide the source and destination in their respec-
tive clouds we use the concept of a delegated source and
destination which is similar to the phantom source concept
of Kamat [6]. Node S randomly selects one or more nodes
from the set BS to act as delegated sources. Similarly D ran-
domly selects one or more nodes in its cloud BD to act as
delegated destinations. The delegated sources are required
to have connectivity (typically multi-hop) with the source S.
Similarly the delegated destinations must have connectivity
with the destinationD. Real packets are relayed locally from
S to the delegated sources. A delegated source node will set
up route(s) to forward real packets to reach a delegated des-
tination node. Thus, real packet traffic will ‘move’ from
the source cloud to the destination cloud via the route(s)
between a delegated source–destination pair. After reach-
ing the delegated destinations, real packets are forwarded
locally to the actual destination D. Delegated sources find
routes to delegated destinations using a suitable anony-
4 Security Comm. Networks 2010; 3:1–27 © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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mous routing protocol (e.g., see References [14,15]). The
delegated source–destination nodes hide the communica-
tions of the real source with the real destination. In the
event a delegated source or destination node is attacked, the
protocol can include options to chose and set-up another del-
egated source–destination pair to resume communications
through a new route. If we do not use delegated source–
destination nodes, and if the source from one cloud sends
packets directly to the destination in the other cloud, then
the route between the source and destination may possibly
be disclosed.
With the above set-up, SECLOUD achieves
source/destination privacy in a local region. In a sin-
gle source–destination scenario, the global attacker will
have to guess the source from the set of nodes BS and the
destination from the set of nodes BD. Assuming that BS
and BD are disjoint, SECLOUD results in the commu-
nicating pair anonymity level of λ = 1 − (1/BS)(1/BD).
To further improve the hiding of sources/destinations one
can simply increase the size of the clouds (BS, BD) used.
Additionally, SECLOUD can create fake sources and fake
destination clouds as well. The fake sources/destination
clouds will behave in a manner similar to the real source
destination clouds and will communicate with each other.
Fake clouds increase the likelihood of misleading the
attacker who may attack (e.g., by jamming) the fake
clouds instead of the real clouds. Obviously the fake
clouds will improve the anonymity but at the expense
of additional overhead. Specifically, with f disjoint fake
clouds each using the same cloud sizes as the true source
and destination BS and BD, the anonymity becomes
λ = 1 − (1/(f + 1))(1/(BS))(1/(BD)).
The transmission overhead factor of SECLOUD for the
single source–destination scenario assuming only a single
delegated source–destination pair can be estimated as fol-
lows. Let L be the length of the shortest path between
S and D and LB be the length of the path between
the source S through a delegated source–destination pair
to the destination D. Then the transmission overhead
factor—TOF—consists of the dummy packets transmitted
within the clouds and the additional transmissions arising
from using the longer route through a delegated source–
destination pair. Assuming all nodes involved in SECLOUD
transmit the same number of packets, TOF can be approx-
imated as TOF ≈ (BS + BD + LB)/L. If we use f fake
clouds and each fake cloud transmits the same number of
packets as the real clouds, the transmission overhead factor
becomes TOF ≈ (f + 1)(BS + BD + LB)/L.
5. THE ANONYRING PROTOCOL
The general idea of ANONYRING (anonymous ring) is to
obfuscate the source and destination node locations with a
ring of nodes constructed through the source and destina-
tion.
ANONYRING begins with a discovery procedure like
the one used in SECLOUD. All nodes broadcast a hello mes-
sage to discover all their one-hop neighbors N(1, i) for i =
1, 2, ..., m, where m is the total number of one hop neighbor
nodes. Then, the nodes in N(1, i) discover their respective
neighbors N(2, i). Consequently, each node will con-
struct the list: {N(1, i), N(2, i), N(3, i), . . . N(k, i)}, where
N(k, i) is the set of its kth hop neighbors. This initialization
process of neighbor discovery is done periodically by all
nodes in the network.
Once the discovery phase is over the source node initi-
ates ring formation. Several algorithms exist in the literature
for connecting a set of nodes into a ring topology [20,21].
We illustrate this with a simple successive disjoint paths
procedure. Specifically, the source node S finds the short-
est direct path to the destination node using an anonymous
routing protocol. Let the shortest route be L hops long
and consist of the nodes {Ns1 , Ns2 , . . . Nsi , . . . NsL−1 }. The
source node S then repeats the routing procedure to the
destination but not considering the nodes already found
in the shortest path route. That is, S finds a second route
which is M hops long {N2s1 , N2s2 , . . . N2si , . . . N2sM−1 } that
is node disjoint with the first route. Obviously the two
routes when put together will form a ring containing S
and D and consisting of RS = L + M nodes. Note than
one can choose to increase the ring size RS by selecting
longer disjoint routes between the source and destina-
tion (i.e., instead of the two shortest disjoint routes could
pick the two longest disjoint routes or some combina-
tion in between) at the expense of additional overhead.
In our simulations, we try to pick rings by moving a few
hops beyond the shortest routes in order to increase the
anonymity.
In ANONYRING all nodes in RS (excluding nodes S and
D) will be marked as pseudo-sources on the ring and are
requested to transmit encrypted dummy packets at a rate
similar to the source transmission rate and to forward real
packets when available from node S to node D. Dummy
packets are dropped by receiving neighbor nodes. Note the
encrypted real packets can be broadcasted either clockwise
or counterclockwise or both ways from source S to reach
destination D depending on the required level of security
and transmission reliability.
With the above set-up, ANONYRING achieves
source/destination privacy within a ring of RS nodes. In
single source–destination case, a global attacker will have
to guess the source or destination from any of the RS ring
nodes. For multiple source–destination scenarios, several
rings can be constructed for each source–destination pair.
To improve the efficiency of ANONYRING, if possible, a
larger common ring can be used to blend different source–
destination pairs. For a single source–destination pair since
the set of R nodes hiding the source and destination are not
disjoint the anonymity is given by λ = 1 − 1/(RS2
)
. This
assumes that the global attacker does not know where the
source and destination nodes are located the ring. In fact,
they could be adjacent nodes. The transmission overhead
factor (TOF) of ANONYRING is approximately TOF ≈
RS/L, where L is the length of the shortest path between S
and D.
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6. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the RW, FP,
SECLOUD, and ANONYRING schemes we used NS-2
to simulate an ad hoc network of 400 nodes distributed
in an area of 2000 m × 2000 m. Two different node dis-
tribution models were used in the simulations: perturbed
grid distribution and random distribution. In the perturbed
grid case, nodes were located in a perturbed 20 × 20
grid. The coordinates of each node (xi, yj) were ran-
domly chosen using uniform random variables in the ranges
(100i − p100, 100i + p100) and (100j − p100, 100j +
p100), where p is the perturbation parameter and i =
1, . . . 20 and j = 1, 2, . . . , 20, respectively. For the ran-
dom node distribution case, the coordinates of the nodes
(xi, yi) for i = 1, 2, . . . , 400 were independently and ran-
domly chosen in the range from 0 to 2000 m using a uniform
[0 − 2000] random number generator.
After the nodes were distributed, we employed the Quasi-
Unit disk graph (Q-UDG) model [22] to determine the
connectivity between nodes and the network topology. In
the Quasi-UDG model, a link exists between two nodes if
the inter-nodal distance d is less than αR, where R is the
transmission range of the node and α is the Q-UDG fac-
tor (0 ≤ α ≤ 1). For distances d greater than R, there is no
link connectivity. However, for αR ≤ d ≤ R, the link will
exist with probability (R − d)/(R − αR). In our simulation
we set α = 0.2 and R = 145m. We consider only a single
source–destination pair to make it easier for the attacker to
compromise the privacy. The source node is randomly cho-
sen from the region (100 m ≤ x ≤ 900 m) and (100 m ≤
y ≤ 900 m) and the destination node is randomly selected
from (1100 m ≤ x ≤ 1900 m) and (1100 m ≤ y ≤ 1900 m)
of the network. The source sends 5000 real packets in a time
window of T seconds. All simulations are repeated 15 times
and results are averaged for each tested scenario.
As noted earlier, we compare the RW, FP, SECLOUD,
and ANONYRING based on anonymity, unlinkability, and
entropy. We determine unlinkability and anonymity as fol-
lows. To visualize linkable communications, the attacker
can simply plot a 3-D graph of the number of packets ui
transmitted by each node i during time interval T with
the approximate location of each node. Additional process-
ing can help the attacker to better quantify linkability. The
attacker will sample n of the nodes that have the highest
number of packets transmitted during the time interval T
and computes the average value U of packets transmitted.
Then nodes that transmit at least βU packets are marked
where 0 < β < 1. A 2-D or 3-D graph of nodes, the num-
ber of packets transmitted and the marked nodes are used to
determine possible communication paths, sources, and des-
tinations. We pick n = 10 in our simulations. The values of
n and β will create sharp or fuzzy boundaries in the graph.
Based on these boundaries, we count the size of |A|—the
number of nodes within which the source and destinations
are hidden and use it to determine the anonymity. In the
case of the RW scheme, we do not include the nodes at the
boundary of the network in picking n or marking nodes, as
this would cause bias due to packet transmissions bouncing
back.
Another approach to determine the linkability is to con-
vert the packet count information into an image and use
an edge detection algorithm to reveal source/destination
locations as well as the communication route. For the edge
detection, a 2-D matrix of packet counts of node transmis-
sions is formed and is treated as a matrix of pixels. The
pixel intensities are normalized between 0 and 255 repre-
senting the packet count at a node. We apply the Canny
edge detection [23] image processing algorithm to extract
the contour of traffic flows from the pixel information. The
algorithm first smoothes the image to eliminate noise pixel
intensities and finds the image gradient to highlight regions
with high spatial derivatives. It then tracks along these
regions and suppresses any pixel that is not at the maximum
(non-maximum suppression). The gradient matrix is further
reduced by hysteresis thresholding. The resulting shape of
the contour observed from traffic pattern analysis is used
to deduce the location of traffic sources and destinations if
possible.
Determination of the entropy h is straightforward as
one simply counts the number of packets ui at each node
i and the total number of packets V transmitted in the
network during time interval T . The fraction of pack-
ets sent by i is pi = ui/V and the entropy is defined as
H = −∑
i
pi log2 pi.
We discuss typical simulation results for each scheme
(i.e., RW, FP, SECLOUD, and ANONYRING) in turn below
for the perturbed grid network topology. For the sake of
brevity we do not include results for the random topology
as the conclusions are similar for both topologies.
6.1. Random walk technique
With random walk (RW) [3,6], packets are forwarded in a
random fashion from one hop to the next until they reach the
destination. A probability Pr is used at each hop to decide
how random the forwarding is, where (0.5 ≤ Pr ≤ 1.0). If
Pr = 1.0, there is no randomness and the packet is sent to
next hop node on the shortest path to the destination. We
varied the RW parameter (1 − Pr) in steps of 0.05 from
0.05 ≤ (1 − Pr) ≤ 0.5.
In Figure 1, a matrix of the number of packets ui trans-
mitted by each node i is shown for random walk with
(1 − Pr) = 0.1 (sample of one simulation). Nodes are not
located exactly as shown but their relative positions are
maintained in the matrix. The source node S (yellow color)
sends 5000 packets to destination node D (blue color).
Using n = 10, β = 0.5, we find βU = 2072 and mark all
nodes transmitting more than βU packets. As shown in
Figure 1, the entire route is revealed. The edge node at
the source is even more apparent as it will have a global
maximum (highest traffic density node). The destination is
one-hop away from the next highest traffic node with packet
count 4065. Surprisingly the normalized entropy for the
6 Security Comm. Networks 2010; 3:1–27 © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Figure 1. Random walk Pr = 0.9.
(1 − Pr) = 0.1 case is still quite high at H = 0.8 not pro-
viding any indication of the poor obfuscation in this case.
The correlation/linkability between the source and destina-
tion node arises due to the nature of the underlying traffic
pattern. We find strong source–destination node pair corre-
lation for low values of probability (1 − Pr) of the random
walk.
As the RW parameter (1 − Pr) increases, the traffic pat-
tern is more skewed and the obfuscation is better. In Figure
2, a matrix of the number of packets ui transmitted by each
node i is shown for random walk with (1 − Pr) = 0.3. The
source node S (yellow color) sends 5000 packets to destina-
tion node D (green color). Using n = 10, β = 0.4, we find
βU = 1160 and mark all nodes transmitting more than βU
packets. An attacker gets a set of possible paths between
the source and destination. The destination node can be
guessed to be near nodes with highest ui’s, that is at the cir-
cled nodes in Figure 2 with packet counts 2570, 1830, 1498,
1366, 1318, 1473, and 1163. The destination anonymity is
Figure 2. Random walk (1 − Pr) = 0.3, ˇ = 0.4.
Figure 3. Three dimensional graph of ui for random walk (1 −
Pr) = 0.3.
6/7 (i.e., |A| = 7), whereas the source node packet count is
the maximum in its vicinity and can be easily detected—so
it’s anonymity is zero.
Figure 3 shows a 3-D visualization of the processed
global traffic counts ui and marked nodes of Figure 2,
(i.e., (1 − Pr) = 0.3, n = 10, β = 0.4). Notice that one can
clearly make out the source node and identify a zone of
possible locations for the destination.
The output of the edge detection algorithm on the packet
count data is shown in Figure 4. Clearly, the attacker can
identify the source and the destination with high probability.
The normalized entropy values H for RW are plotted in
Figure 5 versus (1 − Pr). As one would expect the entropy
values increase with decreasing Pr . Notice that the entropy
values are high for even low values of (1 − Pr) even though
the linkability is quite high as illustrated above. Moreover,
the entropy values are very close making it hard to use them
meaningfully.
The transmission overhead factor (TOF) is the ratio of
total number of packets transmitted with RW over the total
Figure 4. Edge detection output for RW (1 − Pr) = 0.3.
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Figure 5. Random walk—normalized entropy.
number of packets transmitted with shortest path routing
and no RW scheme. Figure 6 shows TOF versus (1 − Pr).
The overhead is high and the anonymity and unlinkability
are not adequate as noted earlier. For example, at (1 − Pr) =
0.3 the transmission overhead is approximately 400%.
6.2. Fractal propagation technique
In fractal propagation, neighbor nodes along a forwarding
path from source to destination generate fake packets with
probability Pfake, and the fake packets are propagated K
hops by successive neighbor nodes randomly selected. A
higher (Pfake,K) is expected to enhance communication
privacy at the cost of extra overhead.
The results of traffic visualization for one simulation sam-
ple by marking nodes (n = 10, β = 0.5, βU = 3197) is
shown in Figure 7 for Pfake = 0.1,K = 5. We can iden-
tify a single source node (yellow color) transmitting 5000
packets to the destination node 13-hops away, denoted by
cell D (blue color).
The 3-D traffic graph shown in Figure 8, illustrates a
similar result where the peak traffic nodes are aligned. The
anonymity is zero since the source–destination locations
Figure 6. Random walk—transmission overhead factor.
Figure 7. Fractal propagation Pfake = 0.1, K = 5.
are both distinguishable by a global attacker. The destina-
tion node is just 1-hop away from the node with packet
count 5759. Note that the normalized entropy H is quite
high at (H = 0.81) though obviously the anonymity and
unlinkability to a global attack is poor. As one would expect
increasing the rate of fake packets and their propagation dis-
tance improves obfuscation. For example, in Figure 9, for
the same source and destination nodes, a higher probability
of fake packet generation (Pfake = 0.2) is used with fractal
propagation. The source and destination nodes can both still
be located using the same visualization methodology (for
n = 10, β = 0.5, in this case βU = 3859) as before.
The output of the edge detection algorithm is shown
in Figure 10. The same conclusions as to the location of
the source and destination can be extracted by the global
attacker from this type of analysis.
In Figure 11, the impact of varying Pfake and K on
the average normalized network transmission entropy H is
shown. The entropy increases as more fake packets (higher
Figure 8. Three dimensional visualization of FP Pfake = 0.1, K =
5.
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Figure 9. Fractal propagation Pfake = 0.2.
Pfake) are propagated. Similarly, for a fixed probability of
fake packet generation, the average entropy is higher when
the distance K of the fake packet propagation is larger.
While the mean entropy values increase with Pfake and K,
they provide no meaningful information about the ability to
obfuscate the source and destination.
The overhead cost with FP is shown in Figure 12. TOF
here, as before, is the ratio of the total number of packet
transmissions using FP to that with shortest path routing
and no FP scheme. The transmission overhead increases
significantly for higher Pfake and K, as depicted in Figure
12. The extra overhead transmission cost is more compared
to the relative increase in entropy values for corresponding
Pfake andK. Obviously asPfake andK increase, the overhead
grows significantly. Even Pfake = 0.2 and K = 5 results in
a high transmission overhead factor (TOF) of 1159%, but
the anonymity and unlinkability are poor.
In comparison with fractal propagation, the unlinkabil-
ity of RW when Pr is decreased, is better than FP when
it’s parameters Pfake and K are increased. However in both
cases the normalized entropy is misleading in assessing the
ease in locating the source and destination nodes that are
Figure 10. Fractal propagation Pfake = 0.2 edge detection.
Figure 11. Fractal propagation—normalized entropy.
communicating.
6.3. SECLOUD
Here we test SECLOUD under similar circumstances as the
RW and the FP schemes. First we consider a single dele-
gated source (labeled as S’) and single delegated destination
(labeled as D’). We use k = 3 and BS = BD = 20 for the
simulation. The results of visualization of the traffic counts
ui at each node is shown in Figure 13. One can clearly see
that as designed, SECLOUD creates two irregular clouds
of identical broadcasting nodes (highlighted in grey cells)
around the source and destination. This ensures the hiding
of the source and destination among their cloud regions,
since the source could be any node inside the cloud, (i.e.,
not necessarily at the center or the edge).
Figure 12. Fractal propagation—overhead.
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Figure 13. SECLOUD with single S-D.
Figure 14 shows the 3-D visualization of the processed
global traffic counts ui of Figure 13. The attacker can see
the communication path but no local or global maxima in
the network. Thus, the linkability will not lead the attacker
to the real source or destination, but only to the irregular
cloud broadcasting region.
In Figure 15, we show a sample result for multiple dele-
gated sources and delegated destinations. Figure 15 shows
two irregular clouds of nodes broadcasting packets (high-
lighted in red) formed around the source and destination.
The source sends 5000 packets using five delegated source–
destination pairs for five transmission paths. Although using
multiple paths is more complex to manage and setup, it has
several advantages compared to a single path. In the case
where an attacker is resident on a path, using several dis-
joint paths will allow some of the traffic to explicitly avoid
that attacker. Moreover, using multiple paths will distribute
the load of broadcasting the packets by intermediate nodes
Figure 14. Three dimensional visualization of SECLOUD with
single path.
Figure 15. SECLOUD with multiple paths.
Figure 16. SECLOUD with single S-D: edge detection.
on the paths. The multiple paths also increase the unlink-
ability of the real source–destination pair. The anonymity
level is similar to the case of SECLOUD with single path,
as described previously.
The output of the edge detection algorithm for
SECLOUD when a single delegated source and destina-
tion is used is shown in Figure 16. The shape extracted by
the global attacker only reveals the cloud area and the path
linking the two clouds.
Figure 17. SECLOUD with multiple paths—edge detection.
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Figure 18. SECLOUD—normalized entropy.
Figure 17 shows the edge detection output when multi-
ple delegated sources and destinations are used, resulting in
multiple paths between the clouds. Notice that edge detec-
tion image analysis only shows the contour of the cloud
regions not the paths.
In Figure 18, the impact of varying the cloud size
BS = BD = B on the average normalized network trans-
mission entropy H is shown. The figure shows that the
entropy slowly increases with the cloud size. Notice that
the entropy values are low compared with the entropy val-
ues obtained from fractal propagation and random walk.
However SECLOUD has higher anonymity and unlinkabil-
ity and overall has a better ability to hide the source and
destination nodes.
The overhead of the SECLOUD protocol versus the cloud
size when both clouds are the same size (i.e.,B = BS = BD)
is shown in Figure 19. TOF here, as before, is the ratio of the
total number of packet transmissions using SECLOUD to
that with shortest path routing and no SECLOUD scheme.
Figure 19. SECLOUD—transmission overhead.
Figure 20. SECLOUD with single S-D and fake S-D.
Figure 19 shows a linear increase in TOF with larger cloud
size. In comparison with RW one can see that with a cloud
size B = 20, the TOF is about the same as the RW scheme
with (1 − Pr) = 0.3. However, SECLOUD has a better abil-
ity to hide the source/destination than the RW scheme.
Comparing SECLOUD with FP, one can see that the TOF
of SECLOUD is much less than FP.
6.3.1. Fake clouds.
As noted earlier, one can further improve the obfuscation
performance of SECLOUD by adding fake clouds. Figure
20 shows typical results for SECLOUD with a single del-
egated source destination pair with BS = BD = 20 and a
fake source destination pair with a single delegated source
destination pair andBS = BD = 20. The results can be com-
pared to the case without a fake cloud in Figure 13. With
the fake cloud, the attacker now not only needs to guess the
location of the source and destination within a cloud, but
Figure 21. SECLOUD with multipaths and fake S-D.
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Figure 22. SECLOUD with multipaths and fake S-D.
it also has to select the correct cloud to attack. Obviously,
both the anonymity level and the unlinkability increase with
the number of fake clouds and their sizes.
In Figure 21, we show a sample result with multiple dele-
gated source destination pairs and a fake cloud with multiple
delegated source destination pairs. In addition to having
all the benefits of the previous approaches, this approach
further increases the unlinkability and anonymity.
Figure 22 shows the corresponding edge detection results
for the case of a single cloud and a fake cloud both with mul-
tiple delegated source and destinations. The edge detection
image analysis shows the contour of the cloud regions only.
6.4. ANONYRING
Finally, we evaluate ANONYRING in the same fashion as
RW, FP, and SECLOUD. In Figure 23, we show a typi-
cal visualization of traffic packet counts ui for each node
when the ANONYRING scheme is used. ANONYRING
creates a ring of nodes that includes the source S and desti-
nation D nodes. The source node (S) transmits 5000 packets
by randomly choosing the clockwise or counter clockwise
direction along the ring to the destination node (D). In the
Figure 23. ANONYRING traffic shape.
Figure 24. ANONYRING traffic shape—3-D visualization.
example shown here the destination d is at a distance of 24
hops in the clockwise direction and 27 hops in the counter
clockwise direction.
Figure 24 shows the 3-D traffic visualization chart of the
packet count recorded at nodes in the ring only. One can see
that the source and destination locations are well hidden and
indistinguishable from the other nodes transmitting.
Figure 25 is the corresponding edge detection diagram of
the ANONYRING technique that confirms the observations
in Figures 23 and 24. The attacker will only be able to
visualize the ring path not which pair of nodes are the true
source and destination.
In Figure 26, the impact of varying the ring size R
on the average normalized network transmission entropy
H is shown. The entropy slowly increases with the ring
size. Notice that the entropy values are slightly lower than
SECLOUD and RW and much lower than the entropy val-
ues obtained from FP. However, ANONYRING has higher
anonymity and unlinkability and overall hides the source
and destination nodes better than RW and FP.
The overhead of the ANONYRING protocol versus the
ring size is shown in Figure 27. TOF here is again the
ratio of the total number of packet transmissions using
ANONYRING to that from shortest path routing and no
Figure 25. ANONYRING—edge detection.
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Table I. Results summary.
Protocol Anonymity Unlinkability Overhead
Random Walk Least Low Medium
Fractal Propagation Low Low Highest
SECLOUD Variable with Cloud size can be High High Variable Low to High
ANONYRING Variable with Ring size can be High High Moderate
Figure 26. ANONYRING—normalized entropy.
ANONYRING in the network. In Figure 27, the dots rep-
resent the measured simulation results and the line is a
curvelinear regression fit to the data. Note that the TOF
in the figure does not vary much with ring size and actually
goes down with larger ring sizes. This is not surprising given
the procedure used in constructing Figure 27, specifically
we picked a specific source–destination pair and then vary
the ring size for four values, then we repeat the procedure for
three different source–destination pairs. Thus, both RS and
L increase resulting in a roughly constant TOF. In general
for a fixed shortest path distance L between a communi-
cating pair the TOF will increase linearly with increases in
RS.
In comparison with RW one can see that the TOF is for
small rings slightly higher than RW, but is lower for larger
ring sizes. When compared with FP, ANONYRING has a
much lower TOF than the FP scheme. Lastly when com-
paring SECLOUD with ANONYRING one can see that the
TOF of ANONYRING is slightly less than SECLOUD. The
anonymity of ANONYRING is higher than SECLOUD if
the ring size RS is equivalent to SECLOUD cloud BS, BD
sizes, specifically RS = BS + BD.
6.5. Summary of results and comparison
In comparing the four obfuscation schemes based on the
sample results above and additional results not included
here for the sake of brevity, we can make several inter-
esting observations. First, all four schemes show that one
must increase the overhead to increase the anonymity and
unlinkability of a source destination pair. Secondly, entropy
as a metric is misleading as to the actual anonymity and
Figure 27. ANONYRING—transmission overhead.
unlinkability provided, thus we do not consider it in the
following. In comparing the four schemes we summarize
our results in Table I. The random walk scheme while eas-
ily implemented and with moderate overhead was shown
to provide little anonymity and unlinkability in the pres-
ence of an attacker with global traffic knowledge. Similarly,
the fractal propagation scheme was found to have poor
anonymity and unlinkability when the attacker can visualize
the network wide traffic. Furthermore, the fractal propa-
gation scheme had the highest overhead of any scheme
studied. The SECLOUD scheme was shown to provide
better anonymity and unlinkability and to have easily con-
trolled parameters in the cloud sizes that directly effect
the anonymity. Additional features such as increasing the
number of delegated source destination pairs in the cloud
and fake clouds can be added to increase anonymity. The
overhead was found to be variable with these parameter
but could be selected to compare favorably with random
walk while providing much higher levels of anonymity and
unlinkability. The ANONYRING scheme was also shown
to provide the highest levels of anonymity and unlinkabil-
ity with moderate levels of overhead and to have a single
tunable parameter in the ring size RS.
The overhead performance and anonymity level of sev-
eral cases of SECLOUD from simulations are shown in
Table I. Using fake source–destination pairs will approxi-
mately double the overhead compared to the case without
using any fake source–destination. As we increase the size
of the cloud, the anonymity will increase but the overhead
also will increase.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we addressed the problem of source–
destination obfuscation in a wireless ad hoc network in the
presence of an attacker with network-wide traffic knowl-
edge. Previously, in the literature the random walk and
fractal propagation schemes have been proposed to address
the location privacy of source and destination nodes in ad
hoc or sensor networks. Entropy of packet transmissions
has been used as the main metric for evaluation. In this
paper we showed that these current approaches can not
provide sufficient obfuscation of the source, destination,
and communication paths when the attacker can visualize
the transmissions and infer contextual information. Fur-
thermore, we showed that entropy is not a good metric
for evaluating the obfuscation provided. To overcome the
weaknesses of existing schemes, we proposed two novel
techniques (1) SECLOUD: Source and Destination Seclu-
sion using Clouds to obfuscate the true source/destination
nodes and make them indistinguishable among a group of
neighbor nodes, and (2) ANONYRING: Anonymous Ring
which hides the source/destination nodes within a group
of nodes that form a ring. Our comparative simulation
study showed that both proposed techniques work well even
under network-wide traffic visualization and analysis by an
attacker. Furthermore the proposed techniques are shown to
be superior to existing random walk and fractal propagation
schemes in terms of overhead, anonymity, and unlinkability.
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